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From Policy “Frames” to 
“Framing”: Theorizing a More 
Dynamic, Political Approach
Merlijn van Hulst1 and Dvora Yanow2,3
Abstract
The concept of frames or framing, especially cast as “frame analysis,” has an established history 
in public policy. Taking off from the work of Donald Schön and Martin Rein, we develop the 
idea of policy analytic framing, the more dynamic of the two terms, in ways that strengthen 
what we see as its promise for a more process-oriented and politically sensitive understanding 
of the activities it is used to characterize. We argue that such an approach needs to engage 
the following aspects of the work that framing does: sense-making; selecting, naming, and 
categorizing; and storytelling. In addition, frame theorizing needs to engage not only the way 
issues are framed but also the intertwining of framing and frame-makers’ identities, and the 
meta-communicative framing of policy processes.
Keywords
policy framing, policy frames, frame analysis, policy analysis, sense-making, naming, categorizing, 
storytelling, Martin Rein, Donald Schön
The concept of frames or framing, especially cast as “frame analysis,” has an established history 
in public policy studies, building largely on the work of Donald Schön and Martin Rein. It is an 
important analytic “tool” for those seeking to understand, for instance, issues in the mismatch 
between administrators’ implementation of legislated policies and policy intent. Originally 
coined elsewhere (Bateson, 1955/1972a), the concept had, by the 1990s, been taken up in a wide 
range of academic disciplines. These included, in addition to public policy analysis (e.g., Rein, 
1983a, 1983b; Rein & Schön, 1977; Schön, 1979/1993; Schön & Rein 1994, 1996), artificial 
intelligence and psychology (e.g., Minsky, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), linguistics (e.g., Fillmore, 1982; Lakoff, 1987; Tannen, 1979; see Cienki, 2007), social 
movement studies (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Morris & Mueller, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, 
Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; for an overview, see Benford & Snow, 2000), communica-
tion studies (e.g., D’Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2012; Entman, 1993; for a critical overview, see 
Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011), dispute resolution (e.g., Dewulf et al., 2009; Putnam & 
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Holmer, 1992), and even music (Cone, 1968). Yet as the Rein–Schön policy analytic approach to 
framing is, today, less well known than its version in the social movement literature, public pol-
icy and administration scholars might be more likely to turn to the latter than the former in seek-
ing to explain frame-related issues. Given what we see as the greater suitability of their approach 
for analyzing policy processes, we think the ideas they developed worth revisiting and extending 
in ways that enhance their applicability to dynamic, power-sensitive policy and administrative 
issues.
Although Schön also explored the subject in his own scholarship on metaphors (1979/1993) 
and reflective practice (e.g., 1983, 1987)—each of which might be understood, at least in part, as 
engaging aspects of framing—its policy applications are most fully elaborated in his collabora-
tive work with Rein. Where Rein used “frame-reflective analysis” interchangeably with “value-
critical analysis” (on this point, see Schmidt, 2006/2013), together they began focusing on frame 
analysis as “a methodology for problem setting” (Rein & Schön, 1977, p. 237). Later, they added 
its utility for investigating the possible resolution of policy controversies (Rein & Schön, 1986, 
1993), and in particular those they saw as “stubborn” (Rein & Schön, 1991) or “intractable” 
(Rein & Schön, 1996; see also Rein, 1983a, 1983b; Schön, 1963/2001): prolonged debates on 
issues marked by uncertainties and ambiguities that were “highly resistant to resolution by appeal 
to evidence, research, or reasoned argument” (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. xi).1 Their collaboration 
ultimately led to the co-authored Frame Reflection (Schön & Rein, 1994).
Schön and Rein’s approach to frame analysis has been generative for many policy scholars 
across a range of topics, from waste management to immigrant integration, civil aviation to 
bovine TB (see, for example, Dudley, 1999; Grant, 2009; Hajer & Laws 2006; Hisschemöller & 
Hoppe, 1996; Kaufman & Smith, 1999; Laws & Rein, 2003; Rasmussen, 2011; Schmidt, 
2006/2013; Scholten & Van Nispen, 2008; Sørensen, 2006; van Eeten, 2001; Yanow, 2009). Still, 
for all its utility, their approach warrants further development to realize its policy analytic poten-
tial in the context of intractable policy controversies, in particular with respect to the promise it 
holds out of a dynamic, process-oriented engagement that is politically nuanced and power-sen-
sitive. In this context, it would be particularly suitable for understanding interactions not only in 
formal political arenas but also in governance networks (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) and in the 
more mundane encounters between street-level bureaucrats and their clients (Lipsky, 1980; 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Vinzant & Crothers, 1996). In extending their approach, we 
draw on various ideas we find in Schön’s earlier solo work (1963/2001, 1971), and we join Schön 
and Rein’s treatment of policy frame analysis with ideas deriving from category and narrative 
analyses, two related analytic modes.
To make the potential contributions of this policy analytic focus on framing clearer, we dif-
ferentiate it from approaches that focus on frames. In our reading of these approaches, social 
movement theorizing chief among them, “frames” are often treated as objects people possess in 
their heads and develop for explicitly strategic purposes. By contrast, the policy analytic approach 
we engage here shifts the focus to “framing,” the interactive, intersubjective processes through 
which frames are constructed (cf. Weick, 1979).2 This distinction is more significant than mere 
differences between parts of speech: “frame” signifies a more definitional, static, and potentially 
taxonomizing approach to the subject; “framing” offers a more dynamic and, in our view, poten-
tially politically aware engagement. Although the two treatments are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive,3 each brings different features of the processes conceptualized as frames/framing to 
light. To be sure, Schön and Rein’s work has aspects of both: Their case studies (e.g., of home-
lessness; 1994) trace policy developments over time, listing policy programs adopted in specific 
cases whose names are the equivalent of different frames on the policy problem, and the policy 
settings of those cases introduce some elements of political processes. Our argument develops 
the political character of policy processes more fully, thereby enabling a policy-focused frame 
theorizing and analysis that flesh out the more dynamic and politically sensitive aspects of their 
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work. This also enables us to address some of the issues raised by social movement and dispute 
resolution studies’ treatments of frames (e.g., Benford, 1997; Dewulf et al., 2009).
Knowing something of the conceptual history out of which frame analysis emerged clarifies 
what is at stake in these different approaches. We begin there and with Schön’s and Rein’s basic 
ideas before turning to the further development of a policy analytic approach.
From Biting Monkeys to Quarreling Humans: A Genealogy of 
Frame/Framing Theories
The ur-text for frame analysis—whether used in public policy studies, social movement theoriz-
ing, or some other field of scholarship—appears to be Gregory Bateson’s work (1955/1972a). 
The observational base for his ideas clearly stipulates what is in play in the idea of frames/fram-
ing. Observing monkeys biting each other, Bateson remarked that they were “engaged in an 
interactive sequence of which the unit actions or signals were similar to but not the same as those 
of combat” (1955/1972a, p. 152; emphasis added). That is, to a casual observer or a poorly 
socialized monkey (if there were such a creature), the same actions might be taken as either fight-
ing or playing. Bateson reasoned that the monkeys must have some way of signaling to each 
other—some form of “meta-communication”—that enabled them to discern which of the two 
modes was afoot. They were, in other words, “framing” their actions to signal either fight-biting 
or play-biting.
Bateson’s drawing on animal behavior to theorize social interaction was shared by other 
early-20th-century researchers. One of these, George Herbert Mead (1934), drew on a fight 
between two dogs to illustrate his notion of a “conversation of gestures” (pp. 42-43), an idea 
parallel to Bateson’s about framing:
The act of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his response. There is a relationship 
between these two; and as the act is responded to by the other dog, it, in turn, undergoes change. The 
very fact that the dog is ready to attack another becomes a stimulus to the other dog to change his own 
position or his own attitude. He has no sooner done this than the change of attitude in the second dog in 
turn causes the first dog to change his attitude. We have here a conversation of gestures.
What we see in this description, as in Bateson’s monkeys, is framing—in the sense of an 
understanding of the situation—that is dynamically built and altered in and through the parties’ 
interaction (discussed further below). The difference between Mead and Bateson is the stress that 
Bateson puts on the meta-communication, the framing that “appears” over and above the conver-
sation of gestures. This is what enables the monkeys—and by extension, humans—to understand 
which kind of conversation they are taking part in.4
Bateson’s frame ideas were taken up in social science in two disciplinary arenas, neither of 
which has, on the whole, been cognizant of the other’s frame theorizing: policy analysis and 
social psychology, the latter leading to social movement’s adoption of frames as a key concept, 
as well as its use in other fields, such as dispute resolution and communication studies.5 The use 
of frame analysis in social movement and other studies traces to Erving Goffman (1974; a key 
figure in symbolic interactionism, along with Mead), who used Bateson’s notion in Frame 
Analysis. Developing symbolic interactionist ideas concerning interpersonal constructions of the 
self, Goffman focused on the “definition of the situation” that transpires as people negotiate the 
meaning(s) of their interactions: It is “built up in accordance with principles of organization 
which govern events…and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to 
such of these basic elements as I am able to identify” (Goffman, 1974, p. 10; emphases added). 
Frames, in other words, guide the ways situational participants perceive their social realities and 
(re)present these to themselves and to others; a frame reflects actors’ organizing principles that 
structure those perceptions; and the frame’s “basic” components are capable of being itemized.
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One feature of Goffman’s interactionist “definition of the situation” is that it is not consciously 
created. Instead, it is unconsciously adopted and/or developed by parties to an interaction in the 
course of communicating. Later, Goffman increasingly turned away from the interactionist char-
acter of his earlier work (e.g., Goffman, 1959), finding that approach too “socially constructiv-
ist”: The frame concept he developed in the early 1970s is “less subjective and less determined 
by attitudes and negotiations than was his ‘definition of the situation’” theorizing of the 1950s 
(Victor Vakhshtayn, personal communication, 12 July 2009).6 His work on strategic interaction 
(Goffman, 1970), although still connected to symbolic interaction, shifts to emphasizing the 
strategic aspects of the “game playing” actors engage in, in some situations. Goffmanian frames 
acquired, in this way, a more objectivist-realist character, something notable in the social move-
ment frame literature building on his work (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow 
et al., 1986).
In brief, social movement theorists typically focus on the strategic—conscious, intentional, 
cognitive—character of the different frame groups develop with respect to issues of concern to 
them, altering their positions—that is, their Goffmanian “definitions of the situation”—to 
enhance the possibility of alliances or coalitions.7 In keeping with a Goffmanian understanding, 
which rests on “principles of organization” that govern situations and on identifying frames’ 
“basic elements” (quoted above), much of the social movement literature has sought to develop 
taxonomies of such frames. Two elements central to Goffman’s early theorizing are thereby lost: 
that frames develop through highly situated interactional processes of communication, rather 
than being intentionally created, cognitively, outside an (inter)action context; and that situated 
frames might not lend themselves well to taxonomizing, a universalizing that relies on a sort of 
“trait list” approach that ends up both essentializing specific frames and reifying their content. 
These two aspects—frames emerging during intersubjective processes and their situated charac-
ter—are central to the policy analytic approach developed by Schön and Rein and more suited to 
analyzing the dynamics of policy and organizational processes.
Apparently independently of Goffman’s work and at about the same time, Donald Schön, also 
drawing on Bateson (1972b) and, in particular, his notion of schismogenesis (see Note 4), began 
to elaborate his own concept of framing (along with metaphor) in the context of diffusion of 
innovation theories and organizational studies (e.g., Argyris & Schön, 1974; Schön, 1963/2001, 
1971, 1979/1993).8 In that early work, Schön engaged how and why policy-related publics might 
look at the same situation differently: “The nature of the public problem appears to different 
actors in different and often incompatible ways” because those involved have their own roles, 
interests, perspectives, and access to information (Schön, 1971, pp. 210-211). However, “…once 
having found a way of looking at (and therefore dealing with) a situation which was at first novel 
and puzzling, our impulse to stick with it is overwhelmingly powerful” (Schön, 1963/2001, p. 8). 
Here is how the dynamic of framing can generate frames that appear static.9
In the context of public problems, these processes account for the “intractable policy contro-
versies” that Schön sought to explain together with his social policy studies colleague Martin 
Rein. Theorizing that such controversies entailed incommensurable views and values at play in 
the ways contending parties defined—framed—a policy problem enabled them to explicate how 
it is that policy-relevant actors often argue past each other, disagreeing even over what comprise 
the “facts” of the situation (Rein & Schön, 1986). In this view, analyses of the shortcomings of 
programs created to solve problems that had not been remedied by previous policy programs 
(analyses which themselves sought better programmatic solutions) would not help. Analysts 
needed, instead, to shift “backwards” in their focus—away, that is, from both administrative 
agency actions and legislative processes—to engage the very definition of the policy issue itself 
as the source of difficulties. This needed to take place during the problem-setting phase of the 
policy process (e.g., Rein & Schön, 1977; Schön, 1979/1993; Schön & Rein, 1994; see also 
Schön, 1971).
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This shift backwards—their “methodology for problem setting”—is important because “the 
questions we ask shape the answers [i.e., policy solutions] we get” (Rein & Schön, 1977, p. 236). 
A novel idea in the 1970s, the need to attend to problem definition has since become more 
accepted in policy analysis and public administration (e.g., in theories of network governance; 
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Carol Bacchi (2009a) nicely sums up this shift, proposing as the key 
analytic question, “What’s the problem represented to be?” This is in marked contrast to the 
“What’s to be done?” approach (Gargan & Brown, 1993) characteristic of traditional policy 
analysis, which assumes the definition of the problem as given (cf. Bacchi, 2009b, and Verloo, 
2005, on critical frame analysis).
In attending to the way “worries” are turned into “problems” (Rein & Schön, 1977), policy-
focused frame analysis following Schön and Rein takes up the active work framing accom-
plishes: (a) highlighting certain features of a situation, (b) ignoring or selecting out other features, 
and (c) binding the highlighted features together into a coherent and comprehensible pattern. But 
what enables this way of seeing? Rein and Schön (1977, 1996; Schön, 1979/1993) draw our 
attention to three processes at play in framing: naming, selecting, and storytelling. In naming the 
features of a situation, policy-relevant actors draw on language that reflects their understanding 
of it, often naming the policy problem through metaphor (e.g., housing “decay”; Schön, 
1979/1993). Furthermore, naming in effect selects what should be seen and diverts attention from 
other features. And at the same time, the aspects singled out in naming the problem cohere 
through a storytelling manner of presenting the situation. Telling such situational stories, Rein 
and Schön (1977) argued, typically helps policy-relevant actors to bind elements of a situation 
into a pattern that is coherent and graspable (cf. Rein & Schön, 1996). Storytelling “is at once a 
medium for problem setting and a way of discovering the tacit frames that underlie our problem 
settings” (Rein & Schön, 1977, p. 243).
Focusing on policy “talk” (including its written versions), this approach to frame analysis 
explores the ways in which situation-specific framing may contribute to divisions among policy-
relevant actors. It also explores whether individuals or groups, promoting and maintaining con-
flict deriving from and supported by frame-based cross-communication, thereby prolong the 
intractability of the policy controversy (Schön & Rein, 1994). Schön and Rein theorized two 
sorts of framing processes at play in such situations: rhetorical frames, featuring the persuasive 
use of story and argument in policy debate, and action frames, which more directly inform policy 
programs. Even in cases where those two frame processes overlap, more often “the [rhetorical 
frame] language used to win the allegiance of large groups of people differs from the [action] 
frames implicit in the agreements that determine the content of laws, regulations and procedures” 
(Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 32).
Like the early Goffman, Schön and Rein argued that even though all competent members of a 
society can draw on its culturally specific frames, awareness of them is usually tacit (in Polanyi’s, 
1966, sense, p. 4, that “we know more than we can tell”; see Tsoukas, 2011). This accounts for 
the stubbornness of “intractable” policy controversies: When frames shape policy definition, 
discourse, and debate but are not explicitly recognized as doing so, the reasoning that underlies 
disagreements and contestation is typically not available, explicitly, to be acknowledged and 
discussed. This led Schön and Rein (1994, chap. 7) to advocate for “frame reflection” in the 
policy process: for contending policy-relevant actors to consider how their own frames might be 
contributing to the contentious situations they found themselves in. Perhaps, if actors were will-
ing and able to reflect on their frames, frame shifts—reframing—might occur, and problems that 
had seemed irresolvable might be resolved after all.10
Frame analysis in this tradition has been taken up widely in policy analysis, even if Schön and 
Rein’s work is not always explicitly mentioned or discussed.11 In general, this work does not seek 
to develop taxonomies of frame types characteristic of policy topics (e.g., across educational or 
housing policy domains), examining instead the situated socio-political processes through which 
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framing takes place—the Meadian/Goffmanian understandings or definitions of the situation at 
hand constructed by the multiple interpretive communities party to it. These potentially multiple 
ways of framing a situation may constitute “a contest over the framing of ideas” that shifts atten-
tion “from the contest over individual preferences to the contest over shared meaning” (Abolafia, 
2004, p. 349; see also Stone, 1988/2002, on politics as the struggle over ideas).12
Making Framing Analysis More Dynamic and Political
Schön and Rein can be credited with putting the idea of framing onto the policy analytic table. 
The capacity of this approach for engaging the political dynamism of policy controversies, how-
ever, calls for additional theorizing. We undertake to do this by fleshing out three concepts that 
Schön and Rein introduced but left under-theorized—naming, selecting, and storytelling—and 
bringing in two related ones—sense-making and categorizing. We explore these ideas in the 
context of two concerns central to such theorizing: elaborating the work that framing does, and 
clarifying what it is exactly that gets framed. As it becomes ever more dynamic, policy frame 
analysis increasingly becomes policy framing analysis, exploring the framing of a policy issue, 
the framing of relations among framers, and the framing of the policy-making process itself, 
distinctions we clarify in what follows.
The Work of Framing
Framing is carried out through three distinctive acts, attention to which elaborates its potentially 
dynamic, political character: sense-making; naming, which includes selecting and categorizing; 
and storytelling. Sense-making is a situated process to which policy-relevant actors attend in 
circumstances that are ambiguous or about which there are uncertainties. Intractable policy con-
troversies are clear examples of these. Through their use of language, the other two—selecting-
categorizing-naming and storytelling—draw certain features of an intractable policy situation 
together, thereby both rendering them more coherent and graspable and diverting attention from 
their ambiguities and uncertainties.
Framing as sense-making work. In policy-making, framing is a process in and through which pol-
icy-relevant actors intersubjectively construct the meanings of the policy-relevant situations with 
which they are involved, whether directly or as onlookers and stakeholders. When facing such 
situations, especially when what “worries” (Rein & Schön, 1977) or confronts them is a matter 
of some concern and appears uncertain or ambiguous, actors typically ask, explicitly or implic-
itly, the question that Goffman (1974, p. 8) posed, whose answer “framing” explicates: “What is 
it that’s going on here?” (cf. Jay White’s manager, as told by Ralph Hummel, 1991, p. 36). As 
Schön (1983) put it, “In order to convert a problematic situation into a problem,” actors must “do 
a certain kind of work”: They must “make sense of an uncertain situation that initially makes no 
sense” (p. 40). Imagine, to take a typical example from a common street-level bureaucracy, two 
experienced patrol officers who arrive at the scene of a domestic dispute. Although they enter the 
situation with prior knowledge and experience of previous disputes, they have to assess what is 
going on in this instance, often as it is unfolding. This is analogous (with no irony intended) to 
Bateson’s starting point: Is this play or fight?
The kinds of materials that policy-relevant actors might be confronted with—from more 
“raw” sense data such as sounds, images, or smells to that more “processed,” such as pictures, 
texts, or rumors—are often difficult to combine into a neat, coherent picture. Drawing on some 
prior cognition of the situation, as Schön (1979/1993) argued with respect to metaphors, which 
derives from previous experiences, expectations, and/or emotions, framing provides a scaffold-
ing for perceiving and articulating patterns among its disparate, and perhaps contending, 
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elements. Frames, like metaphors (in a cognitive linguistics perspective; discussed further in the 
next section), are implicit theories of a situation: They model prior thought and ensuing action, 
rendering that action sensible in terms of pre-existing thinking (Geertz, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1987; Yanow, 1992, 2008; cf. Snow et al., 1986). What gets produced in the framing process is 
both a model of the world—reflecting prior sense-making—and a model for subsequent action in 
that world. Framing, then, does two kinds of work: It organizes prior knowledge (including that 
derived from experience) and values held, and it guides emergent action (cf. Rein & Schön, 1977, 
on diagnoses that contain prescriptions for action). Although for analytical purposes it can be 
useful to separate the two, they typically work simultaneously and interactively, and at the level 
of tacit, not conscious, knowledge. The sense-making that framing works to achieve takes place 
in the midst of acting; it is not a conscious, explicitly planned and strategized activity; and enact-
ments of meaning are every bit as much a part of framing processes as the words used to talk 
about those ideas and acts.
The framing of a situation enacts the sense-making work that enables what Rein and Schön 
(1977) called a normative leap from what is to what ought to be (p. 240; see also Schön, 1983, p. 
40; cf. Benford, 1997, p. 416, “signifying work”). Framing enables actors to understand a situa-
tion as being of a certain kind (enacted in categorizing, taken up in the next section), and they can 
start to imagine what could or should happen next in light of prior notions concerning the ways 
certain problems can and should be handled (Rein & Schön, 1977). Although Schön (1979/1993) 
stressed the cognitive character of this process, which might be taken to imply individual sense-
making, policy settings involve more than that. Sense-making has an intersubjective aspect, 
drawing upon direct or indirect interaction with other actors (Weick, 1995; cf. the interactionist 
approach of Mead, 1934 and Goffman, 1959). Indeed, various modes of collective knowing, such 
as practices, cultures, and organizational learning, exhibit similar dimensions of group sense-
making (see, for example, Cook & Yanow, 2011/1993; Schatzki, 2001). Sense-making can also 
entail interacting with non-human elements (cf. Schön, 1983, 1987, on reflective practitioners 
conversing with their materials). These interactions—including gestures and other modes of non-
verbal expression, at times mediated by material objects—draw on more, or other, than cognitive 
ways of knowing alone.13
An important part of the meanings of the acts, events, and things actors are confronted with 
resides not in those entities themselves or in the cognitive frames actors supposedly have, but 
arises, instead, in the course of interacting in and with those acts, events, and things.14 Grasping 
framing’s dynamism rests on understanding that actors act toward things on the basis of the 
meanings things acquire for them in the course of that sense-making (cf. Blumer, 1969; Vickers, 
1965, 1987, on appreciative settings and systems). Combining a Schönian line of thought in 
which practitioners are engaged in conversations with their materials and a Meadian−Goffmanian 
symbolic interactionist one, the sense-making work of framing can be seen to unfold as actors 
engage in a conversation with the situation, where “the situation” intermingles persons, acts, 
events, language, and/or objects. At a certain point in the process, actors attribute some initial 
meaning to the situation at hand, looking then to see what happens as a result.15 This is an interac-
tive and iterative process, in which details and generalities inform one another, a clearer idea of 
what is going on develops, and meanings “emerge.”
In sense-making work, talk and gesture, and observation of both, are highly interactive. There 
is no a priori sequencing to their appearance or mutual influence: Talk and action are not com-
pletely separable, as speech act and multimodal linguistics theorists have noted (Austin, 1975; 
Cienki & Müller, 2008). Moreover, both understanding and the ways of talking about those 
understandings develop in interacting with whatever it is actors are trying to make sense of. 
Much as members of a culture learn to interpret acts, objects, and language in particular ways, the 
meanings that things in a particular policy-making, implementation, or other situation have for 
actors is not given to them by that setting. “Culture” does not comprise a set of stable frames that 
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drive all members of a culture (whether national, organizational, or some other) to see things in 
certain ways: Multiple influences are often at play; multiple possible interpretations co-exist 
within a single cultural “code,” and actors bring their own prior knowledge (from experiences, 
education, and other sources) to situational sense-making. We might say instead that actors draw 
on a repertoire of cultural resources in framing the situations they are confronted with.
Framing’s sense-making work proceeds in the midst of complexities arising from the multiple 
ways that multiple actors, whether individual or collective, potentially have of seeing a problem-
atic situation, developed in the process of making sense of that situation. Different ways of seeing 
often (though not necessarily) entail different problem definitions and different solutions, which 
arise as various actors select various elements from a situation for attention and name and catego-
rize similar ones differently.
Framing as the work of selecting, naming, and categorizing. In introducing the idea of policy framing 
(see also Schön & Rein, 1994), Rein and Schön (1977) talked about “the complementary process 
of naming and framing.” To explicate that relationship, we bring in two other features that work 
together with naming: selecting and categorizing. These three are framing devices in their own 
right.
Consider, for example, “Western European immigration policy.” The phrase does three things 
at once: It selects from among a range of possible features those that—from the framer’s perspec-
tive—warrant attention (mobility in, not out; permanent residence, not temporary labor), it names 
them, and it categorizes (European, not Canadian; Western, not Southern). Through all three of 
these, policy actors draw disparate elements together in a pattern, selecting some things as rele-
vant or important and discarding, backgrounding or ignoring others, occluding other ways of 
seeing (and acting), and thereby silencing them in policy discourse and ensuing action (at least, 
from the perspective of that particular frame). As Rein and Schön (1977) remarked, “Whatever 
is said of a thing, denies something else of it” (p. 239). In these ways, framing lays the conceptual 
groundwork for possible future courses of action, and actors intersubjectively, interactively con-
struct the socio-political world in and on which they act.
Selecting certain aspects of a worrisome situation for attention is a contingent, political act: 
Other features might have been selected; these might have brought other configurations of deci-
sion-makers and resources into play; and they might have focused on aspects of the situation that 
worry other societal groups (cf. Weick, 1995, on attending to situational cues). Even while it is 
contingent and political, such selecting is also a practical necessity, as it reduces the range of 
stimuli bombarding actors’ “sense (and sense-making) receptors” contributing to the ambiguities 
and uncertainties of the situation and of their possible responses, enabling them to frame the situ-
ation they are engaging in ways that they can act in and on.
For purposes of communicating about that framing, the features that are selected for attention 
have to be named. Such policy naming at times invokes metaphors: Concepts whose meaning(s) 
in other situations is (are) known and understood, such that their use in this situation (typically 
without conscious intent) makes what is going on clearer (Schön, 1963/2001, 1979/1993; see 
also, van Hulst, 2008; Yanow, 2008). Political decision-makers often use metaphors that are com-
mon currency within their own socio-political communities or cultures; they may also have 
drawn on those metaphors on previous occasions, reflecting their accustomed ways of dealing 
with situations (e.g., van Hulst, 2008).
In whatever form naming takes, situational elements are categorized, as the “Western European 
immigration” example shows. Even if objects, events, acts, and actors might arrive already cat-
egorized (e.g., in news reports talking about “the living standard of immigrants” in a certain 
country), situation-specific categorizing of sense data and interpretations of these always have to 
take place (see Bowker & Star, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; Yanow, 2003). Categorizing, itself a form of 
naming, entails identifying things as a “this” but not a “that.” (Naming can also draw distinctions, 
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but it does so less explicitly than categorizing.) Differences are thereby established between, for 
instance, natives and immigrants, friends and enemies, victims and perpetrators, normal and 
abnormal, old and new, work and pleasure, fight and play—whatever is relevant to the issue at 
hand. Even when category names do not appear in full-fledged taxonomies—as in the “Western 
Europe” example—other elements in the category set are present by implication (Eastern Europe, 
Africa, North America—as relevant to the policy context).
Like selecting and naming (including metaphorizing), categorizing is a framing device: All of 
these can be ways of highlighting some aspects of a policy discourse while occluding and even 
silencing others, as noted above. In this sense, selecting, naming, and categorizing are “ways of 
world-making,” to use Nelson Goodman’s (1978) phrase. The initial framing or operational “def-
inition” of a policy situation is a way of making a world one can act in, and upon. In the world of 
policy and administrative practices, framing an issue is a condition for being able to do one’s 
work. Selecting, naming, and categorizing are ways not only of shaping the world that one has 
made, but of knowing it (although we certainly do not mean to suggest that policy or other actors 
have the socio-political and/or physical powers to create and change their worlds at will). Street-
level bureaucrats, for instance, select certain features of the clients they meet as they categorize 
the clients’ cases and decide how to handle them (Lipsky, 1980). In another example, calling a 
policy event or situation “worrisome” or “problematic,” thereby distinguishing it from the non-
problematic commonplace, is a key world-making or framing act. Which situations get labeled 
problematic is ultimately contingent: As Murray Edelman (1988) taught us, “conditions that hurt 
people need not become [accepted as] problems” (p. 13). Although often only one feature of a 
situation is explicitly named, thereby framing the situation (as in calling something “an act of 
terrorism”), other, unnamed features (the repertoire of name- or category- and policy-relevant 
elements) may help to establish that meaning (or contest it).
Framing as the work of storytelling. Theorizing policy framing must also include an account of 
storytelling because of their relationship, something Laws and Rein (2003) and Stone (2006) also 
note. Although Rein and Schön’s first and last joint publications engaged both storytelling (1977) 
and narrative frames (1996) and their 1994 book talks in passing, in theoretical terms, about turn-
ing a situation that is experienced as worrisome, uncertain, ambiguous, and probably problematic 
into a policy issue by telling a story about it (Schön & Rein, 1994; cf. Schön, 1979/1993), they 
do not elaborate on how framing works through storytelling.
Beyond selecting and naming some elements and ignoring others, framing also entails 
“bind[ing] together the salient features of the situation . . . into a pattern that is coherent and 
graspable” (Rein & Schön, 1977, p. 239; emphasis added; cf. “weaving a connection,” Gamson 
& Modigliani, 1989, and “frame resonance,” Snow & Benford, 1988, in social movement frame 
theory). Such “binding together” into a pattern is what storytelling achieves (Gabriel, 2000; van 
Hulst, 2012), and it does this work through “narrative frames” (Rein & Schön, 1996; van Hulst, 
Siesling, van Lieshout, & Dewulf, 2014) or plot lines. These attribute sense to a situation, draw-
ing on “narrative” or “prose” rather than the explicit logical structure of argumentation, for 
instance, or outline.16 Stories frame their subjects as they narrate them, explicitly naming their 
features, selecting and perhaps categorizing them as well, explaining to an audience what has 
been going on, what is going on, and, often, what needs to be done—past, present, and future 
corresponding to the plot line of a policy story.17 By contrast, names, metaphors, and categories 
frame their policy issues without fully, and explicitly, narrating the stories that they condense 
(e.g., “homelessness”; Schön & Rein, 1994), which remain implicit within them (cf. Edelman, 
1964/1985, p. 198, on symbols “condens[ing] a range of ideas, feelings, and sentiments”). Where 
the naming and categorizing aspects of framing might be expressed in one word (e.g., “commu-
nist,” “creationist”), stories elaborate on the perceived policy problem (and perhaps its envi-
sioned solution).
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Storytelling achieves its “certain kind of work” (Schön, 1983, p. 40; see also Forester, 1999, 
p. 29) through introducing and narrating new selections, names, and category schemes or reimag-
ining those already available, gluing these elements together by “emplotting” them (see also 
Czarniawska, 1998, p. 2). That plot weaves story elements together into a text that makes sense 
as a whole: sketching out the situation in which actors find themselves, establishing a situation’s 
beginnings, tracing its development from something unnoticed or perceived as normal to some-
thing perceived as worrisome and/or experienced as problematic, and suggesting or pointing to a 
possible resolution or “end” (Stone, 1988/2002; van Hulst, 2012; but see Shenhav, 2005, on 
political stories’ lack of closure). As policy-making entails collective action, and policy-relevant 
actors often do not agree on what is happening and what needs to or should be done, persuasion 
is called for. In providing plot lines that tie elements together in logical, even motivational or 
causal ways, storytelling is often key to such persuasive efforts (Rein & Schön, 1977; see also 
Throgmorton, 1992; van Hulst, 2012, in the context of planning practice; Sørensen, 2006, on 
storytelling’s role in governance; Shenhav, 2007, in political settings more broadly; Boje, 1991; 
Czarniawska, 1998; Gabriel, 2000; Hummel, 1991; Ingersoll & Adams, 1992; White, 1992, in 
organizational studies and public administration). Storytelling of this sort may be found not only 
during policy design, but also during implementation as individuals frame their policy-related 
concerns by telling their stories about, for instance, housing, legal, welfare, and other problems 
to the public administrators who deal with their cases (e.g., Bennett, 1979; Dubois, 2010; van 
Hulst, 2013).
In aiming to persuade, storytelling typically moves beyond “mere” problem definition 
(Forester, 1999, 2009). In telling the story behind their problems, policy-relevant actors typically 
reach back in time to a moment when all was well, sketching the context in which certain worries 
came into being (van Hulst, 2012). They narrate the history, their history, of what went wrong. 
With more time, they might relate what matters to them and what they fear might happen. 
Whereas such storytelling is often meant to persuade (Stone, 1988/2002; van Hulst, 2012), rest-
ing at times on stereotypical characters and stereotypical depictions of settings and actions, it 
might also be a vehicle for contending parties to listen to others and their views, to reflect and 
even reframe (Forester, 1999, 2009). Indeed, as Forester (2009) notes, it may “be more difficult 
to hurt each other once we know one another’s stories” (p. 187).
Telling stories about a developing situation involves fitting unfolding events into the plot. 
Even in stories that weave together the most surprising events (from the perspective of their nar-
rators) or those that seem to be “the same old story” (the same actors being cast as heroes and 
villains over and over again), storytellers might be working hard backstage (to draw in Goffman, 
1959) to incorporate new elements. And that new material might actually destabilize the story. 
What is paramount for purposes of persuasion is that framing produces a depiction of reality that 
is credible—that “rings true” —and which enables actors to engage in action. Stories do that 
work. As Weick (1995) put it, when it comes to acting in practice, plausibility suffices; accuracy 
is hardly aimed for (if it can ever be achieved). A story, in other words, is “good” when it not only 
creates a coherent, graspable account, but also “holds disparate elements together long enough to 
energize and guide action” (Weick, 1995, p. 61).
In telling about policy action and its human and non-human actors, policy framing stories 
implicitly or explicitly attribute blame or praise and suggest causes of harm or success; they set 
out “a view of what is wrong and what needs fixing” (Schön, 1979/1993, p. 144). As various 
policy-relevant actors bring different and conflicting experiences, expectations, desires, and 
fears to policy situations or develop these in them, conflicts over the interpretation(s) and 
meaning(s) of these narrated stories can be expected, and negotiations over their meaning(s) 
may take place. In this persuasive sense, framing through storytelling manifests discursive 
power.
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What Does Framing Frame?
In policy processes, framing (and reframing) operate on three kinds of entities: the substantive 
content of the policy issue, the identities and relationships of situational actors in the policy pro-
cess, and the policy process itself. Dewulf et al. (2009) suggested a similar approach to framing 
in dispute resolution studies; we adapt it here for policy analysis.
Framing the substance of policy issues. The policy “what” that gets framed through the iterative 
selecting, naming, categorizing, and storytelling processes discussed in the previous section is 
primarily the world of ideas relevant to the policy issue at hand (Rein & Schön, 1986, 1993, 
Schön & Rein, 1994, chap. 2)—their meaning(s) for various issue-relevant interpretive commu-
nities. In analyzing U.S. abortion policy and its supporters and opponents, for instance, Luker 
(1984) explores the two camps’ (pro-life, pro-choice) framing of the idea of motherhood. Swaf-
field (1998) examines the meanings of “landscape” to various parties to debates over New Zea-
land planning and natural resource policies. Schmidt (2000) links the meanings of U.S. 
“English-only” language policy to different ideas and values—frames—concerning immigrants 
and their integration into society. Rasmussen (2011) shows how competing framings of contra-
ception as preventive care, which would require health insurance coverage, themselves, also 
construct issue categories.
In the momentary “freezing” of actors’ policy positions for purposes of description and analy-
sis, framings take on a static aspect. But looking within these for the more dynamic, political 
character of policy framing brings two additional dimensions to the fore: the ways in which 
policy-relevant actors’ identities and the relationships between and among them can also be a 
focus of policy framing, and the ways in which policy processes, themselves, can be subject to 
framing.
Framing policy-relevant actors’ identities and relationships. Conflicts over the meanings of policy 
situations may be rooted not just in different views of the issues at stake. Such conflicts may 
also be located in policy-relevant actors’ senses of their own and other actors’ identities and the 
relationships between or among them, including identities that those actors cherish (Forester, 
1999, 2009; Sinha & Gasper, 2009). Framing works to construct these identities, as well as their 
relationships to one another. These ideas arose in passing in Schön and Rein’s (1994, Part III) 
theorizing as they considered that the shared interests of actors involved in policy conflict, 
along with their willingness to reframe a problematic situation jointly, might help them envision 
pragmatic solutions to even the most intractable of policy issues. We think there is more to it 
than that.
Policy-relevant actors’ identities can become strongly intertwined with a particular framing of 
a policy issue. They might discover their calling, earn their keep, find friends or partners, or be 
in some other way(s) drawn into the articulation of a particular framing of a policy issue, or tied 
in with the organization or group that has constructed, supported, or fought that framing. They 
might, in other words, become “attached” to their problems, not just through formal political acts 
(e.g., having voted for some option), but also in emotional, psychological, social, and/or cultural 
ways. A public change to that position might feel to them like losing a part of who they are—their 
social and/or political identity, or part of that. For actors involved in intractable controversies, 
then, reframing the policy issue might involve reconceptualizing not only vested interests but 
also personal identities—identities that are interwoven with beliefs that the world is or ought to 
be as they perceive it. Schön saw this from the perspective of social systems—he referred both to 
organizations and parts of them and to communities—and their power over individuals: “Threats 
to the social system threaten this framework” of meaning, he wrote. Their power
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. . . becomes understandable, I think, only if we see that social systems provide for their members not 
only sources of livelihood, protection against outside threat and the promise of economic security, but a 
framework of theory, values and related technology which enables individuals to make sense of their 
lives. (Schön, 1971, p. 51)
Yet he did not tie this in with the difficulties of reframing. At issue is an understanding of 
identity as more than a surface layer that can be put on, taken off, or otherwise altered at will. 
Reframing in such circumstances is not always easily done; actors need to find ways in the new 
framing of giving expression to what is meaningful to them.
Framing the policy process. The framing of the policy process itself can also be subject to framing, 
which returns us to Bateson’s point of departure in a view that brings framing’s communicative 
work into focus.
Consider, for instance, disagreement and debate that may unfold concerning the process 
through which an immigration policy, say, has come onto the policy-making agenda. The narra-
tive concerning which party or person introduced the policy in Congress or Parliament, respond-
ing to which specific “triggering event(s)” (e.g., the assassination of a key immigration opponent), 
and who voted for and against it says little to nothing, explicitly, about the substance of the pol-
icy, but everything about its social, cultural, political, and/or other context. “The Labour Party’s 
bill, blocked by the Greens,” for instance, might be something a journalist would say in com-
menting on the policy process; the Labour Party itself could also comment on what is transpiring 
in their exchanges with the Greens. In other words, such framing of the policy-making process 
tells a story about the storytelling and other policy activities. That is Bateson’s notion of meta-
communication: the ways in which people communicate about what is being communicated 
(how the monkeys, for example, communicate that what they are doing is playing, not fighting). 
It is manifest in the concept of meta-governance in public administration theorizing, which takes 
place when the framing of self-governing institutions and networks is “exercised through the 
shaping of the political, financial, and organizational context[s] within which self-governance 
takes place” (Sørensen, 2006, p. 101).
Meta-communication can complicate matters as it allows for endlessly recursive sense-mak-
ing loops concerning policy processes, a sort of “I think that you think that I think that you think 
. . ..” It is, however, very important for a theory of policy framing because through such meta-
communication, actors try to determine the kind of policy-making they and others will undertake. 
Such recursive sense-making can entail a reflective practice, to the extent that policy-relevant 
actors might explore and perhaps question the basic assumptions guiding their thinking and 
actions, especially when these are bringing them into conflict with each other. This reflective 
process could help those actors see their own policy framing, possibly enabling them to grasp 
how it is preventing them from exerting fundamental efforts to change the policy under debate.
Revisiting the How and the What: Framing Analysis in Dynamic and Political 
Modes
The approach sketched out here offers a fuller understanding of the various dimensions of fram-
ing and reframing in complex, controversial, and politically sensitive policy processes. Focusing 
more on framing than on frames draws attention to dynamic processes, rather than treating policy 
frames as stable, self-contained entities whose component elements can be taxonomized and 
generalized. Focusing on dynamism leads us to see the ongoing work framing entails and the 
struggles that can take place over developing and defending certain ways of framing an issue. 
This emphasis also builds bridges to other interpretive analytic modes that offer specific insights 
into elements of framing—those concerned with metaphor and category analyses, and narratives 
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and storytelling, in particular. Analysis of the naming (including metaphors), selecting, and sto-
rytelling embedded in specific policy frames can help clarify the highlighting and blindsiding 
taking place in dealing with intractable situations, ideally leading to reframing and resolution. 
The political dimension of this approach emphasizes the ways clusters of selecting, naming, 
categorizing, storytelling, identity-maintenance (and change), and, indeed, the policy process 
itself gain or lose credibility during and as a result of framings’ use in various moments in policy-
making processes. Schön theorized about framing in several aspects of his work—metaphor, 
frame analysis, reflective practice—which he himself often compartmentalized in different pub-
lications, addressed to different audiences and literatures. Bringing them together, as we have 
done here, to address framing, with additional elements that we see as relevant, makes a fuller 
theorizing possible. We have shown that in toto, these several ideas contribute to elaborating the 
concept that he, together with Rein, sketched out in their frame-specific writings.18
In bringing out more of the dynamism entailed in framing and more of its political side, our 
theoretical development brings greater complexity to the matter of changing existing policy 
framings, shedding light on why reframing might be even more difficult than Schön and Rein 
envisioned. In their account, frame change appears to be a relatively straightforward, cognitive 
matter of reflection and revision. We find that problematic for several reasons. Two develop-
ments in the 1970s, around the time when Bateson’s paper was republished and Schön and Rein 
began their collaborative writing, help explain the limitations of a cognitive approach to frame 
change, along with the need for a more dynamic, politically sensitive policy framing theory and 
the relevance of Bateson’s monkeys to explicating these processes.
First, the unintended consequences of governmental policies and the limits of “technical ratio-
nality” (Schön, 1983) began at that time to become increasingly visible (see, for example, Rein 
& Schön, 1977; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Schön, 1979/1993). The policy implementation that had 
been seen as an undertaking of a-political public administrators who would apply technical ratio-
nality to create problem-solving programs—for a world from which they themselves were 
removed—was “unmasked” as itself a realm of political action (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). 
Some problems turned out to be more “wicked” and “intractable” than anticipated; over the 
years, wars on poverty, on drugs, on terror have turned out to be very hard to win. Implementation 
and street-level bureaucracy studies (and some of the public administration literature of the late 
1980s and beyond) also increasingly showed that policies are at times shaped by public adminis-
trators in their interactions with policy “targets,” rather than exclusively by elected officials. 
Often, then, governments have been fighting the results of “their own” previous actions, and they 
have in recent years become more aware of the fact that they themselves and their actions are part 
of the worlds they try to govern. In this sense, like Bateson’s monkeys, policy-relevant actors are 
engaged in a complicated interaction concerning the “correct” interpretation of the situation they 
are facing. This is more, or other, than a rational, cognitive process tout court.
Second, in a policy problem world increasingly seen as marked by networked governance and 
public–private partnerships, societal actors and governmental actors—citizens, corporations, 
bureaucracies—are increasingly expected to collaborate on solving public problems. Over time, 
the boundaries between policy-makers and “targets” of policy-making—like the distinction 
between those who govern and those who are governed—have blurred. As the distinctions 
between governmental action and actions of others have become more and more interrelated and, 
indeed, dynamic, the “playing field” has become increasingly crowded with framers and situa-
tions to frame, and the extent to which framing, identity-construction, and meta-communication 
prove to involve and influence each other seems to have become increasingly complex. To sort 
out these dynamics, a theory of framing needs to transcend the cognitive efforts of problem set-
ting and solving, taking up instead the constant sense-making work of multiple actors involved 
in framing processes seen to be thoroughly political efforts aimed at policy problems, and the 
identities and relationships of those involved in policy processes.
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Schön’s (1983) theory of reflection-in-action and the cases he and Rein examined in the 1994 
book gave them confidence that working on concrete issues could lead to pragmatic solutions. 
They posited, and hoped, that reflective conversation would lead policy-relevant actors to become 
aware of their frames, such that they would be able to move beyond them. And indeed, convers-
ing together is a first step in creating a context that might become shared, perhaps leading over 
time to frame shifts. As we have argued, however, a significant hurdle to conversing together, let 
alone joint action, might derive from the identities actors develop that are enmeshed in the sides 
they have taken in intense policy controversies. Identity can be hard to bargain over (Forester, 
2009) and to reframe. Before one can get to the work of deconstructing and reconstructing 
frames, emotional issues arising from challenges to personal identities may need to be overcome. 
Indeed, as Schön argued about social systems (see Note 9), actors might well fight to remain the 
same because proposed changes to their definitions of the situation—their framing of it—pose 
challenges to what they find meaningful, including their sense of self, especially in times of crisis 
and change “beyond the stable state” (Schön, 1971).
Play-Fighting and Policy Contestation: Concluding Thoughts
Along with members of the public, practitioners—we have in mind policy-makers, as well as 
partners in governance networks and public administrators charged with implementing poli-
cies—are not always cognizant that problem definitions are not given, but “framed,” let alone 
aware of how such framing takes place. The dynamic, power-sensitive approach we have sketched 
out opens up the processes through which framing occurs. Seeing the sense-making work entailed 
in framing—engaging how selections are made, how names are given, how categories are cre-
ated, and how stories are told—brings a stronger process orientation to framing, seeing it as a 
many-dimensional socio-political process grounded in everyday practices and ordinary beliefs. 
This moves analysis away from generating more static taxonomies of fixed frames toward a more 
dynamic understanding of framing processes, including questions of maintenance and change. 
Although our own empirical research engagements lead us to focus on framing in policy-making 
and organizational contexts, we anticipate that this theorizing will be applicable to other settings 
as well, including social movement and environmental dispute resolution settings in which schol-
ars want to engage power-sensitive analyses of dynamic processes.
Contemplating Bateson’s monkeys enables us to draw out the potentialities of such a policy 
analytic framing, as their situation metaphorically contains a lot of the complexities that play a 
role in policy controversies. This includes ideas that were present in the early dimensions of 
Goffman’s work but which have disappeared from a frame analysis that aims at taxonomies of 
frames. For theorists interested in the philosophical underpinnings of framing theory, what these 
ideas bring to the fore—by contrast with social movement theorizing—is a hermeneutic-phe-
nomenological character that positions intersubjective meaning-making front and center, resting 
on the interactive processes entailed in working out definitions-of-situations. Not only do these 
processes unfold over time; they do so in a not so evidently conscious and strategic fashion. Even 
when it comes to intervening to improve a situation—the aim of assisted reframing—which 
requires making implicit, tacitly known frames explicit, framing is not assessed on the basis of 
its potential to prevail in a contest or its winning or losing capacity.
Frame analysis began as a concern for meta-communication in interactions between two or 
more beings. Although Bateson pointed attention toward the ways in which actors inform one 
another about the interactions they are directly caught up in, the ways in which humans develop 
and make manifest their meanings renders policy framing ever more complex than in the animal 
world (or so scientists think at this point in time). What we are talking about here is not just a 
politics of who gets what, when, and how, but also a politics of who people are or perceive them-
selves to be. Any call for reflection and reframing needs to be acutely aware of and sensitive to 
the all-too-human, power-laden barriers posed by such framing-related identities.
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Notes
 1. Rittel and Webber’s (1973) “wicked problem” in the context of planning theory is a similar idea (intro-
duced initially by Rittel in a 1967 lecture—Churchman, 1967—and presented in 1969 to the Panel on 
Policy Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston). Problem definition 
is also a crucial element in their treatment (see also Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1996).
 2. Analyzing frame analysis from the perspective of dispute resolution, Dewulf et al. (2009) differenti-
ated between a cognitive and an interactional paradigm in frame analysis, which gets at a similar point. 
Tannen and Wallat (1987) had previously identified these two approaches in the literature, arguing that 
both can be seen as dynamic. We disagree.
 3. In the social movement literature, for instance, the concepts are not always used with such clear dis-
tinctions; some accounts of framing, and of sense-making more generally, blend the two approaches. 
For example, theoretical statements may stress the socially constructed character of frames but then 
reify them when itemizing frames in taxonomies (e.g., Snow & Benford, 1992; cf. Benford’s critique, 
1997). Dewulf et al.’s (2009) account of framing in the dispute resolution literature to some extent 
parallels ours.
 4. Bateson (1972b) termed this schismogenesis, an idea Schön took up in his theorizing about reflection-
in-action, encountered below as frame-reflective practice, and in his work on organizational learning 
(Argyris & Schön, 1974).
 5. A recent critical review of frames and framing in media studies (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011), 
for instance, cites no policy works. Framing analysis’ promise for mediating policy controversies, a 
possibility implied in interpretive policy analysis, has developed in dispute resolution, in particular in 
the arena of environmental policy. A stream of theoretical and empirical research has emerged from 
this scholarly community (e.g., Gray & Putnam, 2003; Kaufman & Smith, 1999; Putnam & Holmer, 
1992) seemingly amalgamating social movement and policy approaches: the former, given the field’s 
desire to identify collectivities and their propensity to organize oppositional forces; the latter, in light 
of researchers’ desires to bridge differences and bring about more effective policies. See also Lewicki, 
Gray, and Elliott (2003) for framing in environmental conflicts and Dewulf et al. (2009) for an analytic 
overview of framing in dispute resolution studies.
 6. Vakhshtayn draws our attention to critiques of Goffman’s structuralism (e.g., Denzin & Keller, 1981; 
see also Goffman’s response, 1981), noting that Herbert Blumer, a leading sociologist in constructivist 
symbolic interactionism, had repudiated Goffman’s views even earlier.
 7. For a critical summary of that literature, see Benford (1997) or Benford and Snow (2000).
 8. As far as we know or can uncover, Schön did not come to the frame concept through Goffman’s work, 
although later writings with Rein mention him (Rein & Schön, 1993, p. 146; Rein & Schön, 1996, p. 
89). Schön did, however, discuss Bateson’s ideas in 1970s classroom lectures and in his work with 
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Argyris on Models I and II (Argyris & Schön, 1974). The publication date of this book suggests that 
Schön was already working with Bateson’s ideas when Goffman published his treatment of them (also 
in 1974).
 9. This idea echoes in his later treatment of social systems, whose “dynamic conservatism” (Schön, 1971) 
meant that they would fight hard to remain the same.
10. Frame shifts might also occur, they noted, as a result of precipitating events that do not entail reflec-
tion, such as radical changes in context (Rein & Schön, 1986, 1993), for example, the end of the Cold 
War, the 9/11 attacks.
11. Empirical examples include Linder (1995) on U.S. electro-magnetic frequency emissions, Swaffield 
(1998) on New Zealand natural resource policies, Dudley (1999) on the British Steel Corporation and 
the British government, Schmidt (2000, 2006/2013) on the U.S. “English-only” political movement, 
van Eeten (2001) on The Netherlands’ civil aviation controversy, Laws and Rein (2003) on reframing 
efforts in the U.S. Love Canal scandal, Abolafia (2004) on the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, Scholten 
and Van Nispen (2008) on immigrant integration policies in The Netherlands, and Rasmussen (2011) 
on U.S. contraceptive policy.
12. Such analysis intertwines an analytic approach with a research method, something common in many 
forms of meaning-focused, interpretive research (Yanow, 2007). Seen within the perspective of inter-
pretive approaches to policy analysis (e.g., Fischer, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Yanow, 1996, 
2000, 2007), framing analysis joins a large, and growing, group of methods centering on sense- 
making or meaning-making (here, treated as synonyms) in empirical studies of public policies 
and other aspects of political life, as well as social life more broadly (e.g., Prasad, 2005; Yanow & 
Schwartz-Shea, 2013).
13. The combination of cognitive, social, and human–non-human interfaces clearly begs the question as 
to how this works or what it looks like in practice, something we do not have the space to elaborate 
on. This topic is increasingly being explored in subfields within science and technology studies (e.g., 
Orlikowski, 2007; Suchman, 2005); see also the examples discussed in Schön (1983, 1987).
14. Some would perhaps call this a Wittgensteinian view. Others go further, positing that action precedes 
meaning and that sense-making is always retrospective (e.g., Weick, 1979).
15. Schön (1983) calls such a practice “seeing-moving-seeing.” It echoes Kurt Lewin’s (1947) unfreezing-
moving-freezing model of change (pp. 34-35), both of these resting on a kind of experimentation in the 
moment, as actors “try on” new ideas, attitudes, and acts. It could also be seen as a version of the her-
meneutic circle/cycle of initial sense-making refined by additional subsequent learning. The implica-
tions of our argument here for what has been called policy learning are extensive, and we thank one of 
our reviewers for suggesting we pursue it, something we have no room here to do. We note, however, 
that it suggests a very different take on the subject from that proposed, for example, by Jenkins-Smith 
(1988).
16. Stories are also used to argue with, and arguments are often supported by causal stories (Stone, 
1988/2002), but we do not have space to explore this further.
17. A good deal of the storytelling literature argues that stories are defined by having beginnings, middles, 
and ends (e.g., Gabriel, 2000; Kaplan, 1993), in a kind of Aristotelian treatment. But in political set-
tings, as Shenhav (2005) notably argues, this may not hold. We discuss this further below.
18. In this theorizing, it is clear that “frame” is both an umbrella concept and a specific instance of it, much 
as Miller (1985) argued with respect to metaphor. That is, the things that do framing work include 
names—in particular in the form of metaphors and categories—stories, and frames themselves.
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